Rancho Mirage Revisited

RANCHO MIRAGE SUPREME COURT RECYCLING CASE REVISITED
By John D. Moore, NCRA Vice President and Legal Counsel
28 years ago, the cities of Rancho Mirage and Palm Springs, and their franchise hauler, Waste Management of the Desert, sued to enjoin Palm Springs Recycling Center from collecting bottles, cans, and paper in those cities. The local court granted the injunction, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court , and then in 1994 the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in what became the landmark California case interpreting what materials may lawfully be within a public entity grant of an exclusive solid waste franchise. The industry knows this as the “Rancho Mirage case” establishing the “fee for service” test of whether material is solid waste or not. The validity of the Rancho Mirage ruling has been called into question by a case now pending before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

In 1989, the California legislature passed the landmark AB 939 (the Act) which reworked the regulatory structure of garbage collection and established the infrastructure for California’s recycling industry that exists today. This Act stated as a matter of policy that landfilling materials was environmentally harmful because of the toxicity of landfills and the exhaustion of finite virgin resources. The Act created an express hierarchy with the 3 Rs, stating that post-consumer material should be reduced, reused, and recycled so that only the residue should be considered solid waste, the gentrified term for garbage. The Act imposed a mandate for 50% diversion of materials from landfill by 2000 and authorized $10,000/day penalties for noncompliant public entities. The Act carried over from former law the right of public entities to comply with their health and safety mandates by entering into garbage collection franchises. The Act granted discretion to public entities to grant exclusive solid waste collection requirements only if “the public health and welfare so require.”
Although the Act contains a definition of “solid waste” that may (not shall as some cities argue) be part of an exclusive franchise, disputes immediately arose between the franchised haulers, like Waste Management of the Desert, that preferred a broad definition consistent with former law, and recyclable collectors like Palm Springs Recycling Center, that interpreted AB 939 to mean that materials that went through the 3R hierarchy and were recycled, never became solid waste. “It’s not waste until it’s wasted” was a clever way to describe this point of view. Recyclers at the time viewed the Act as critical to their ability to create an economically sustainable industry.
The Court of Appeal found that the position of the franchised haulers lead to an unconstitutional taking of property rights. The state Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. California’s recycling associations and major businesses at the time participated in this important case by submitting amicus briefs. The amicus briefs of NCRA, CRRA, and Urban Ore, among others, supported the recycler and argued that under AB 939, solid waste was a residual category of materials that were not recovered by the 3Rs- in other words, if it went to the landfill it was waste; if it was recovered and did not go to landfill, it was not solid waste. CRRC, supporting the franchised haulers argued that if someone paid to have post-consumer material taken away, it was solid waste. The cities of Rancho Mirage and Palm Springs, and WMD, did not make this fee for service argument.
The logic of the fee for service test, adopted by the Court, perplexed many in NCRA. Although seemingly absurd, a competing garbage hauler theoretically could pay $1 for anyone’s discards and undercut the franchise hauler. Metals, which had enough value to be purchased by collectors, immediately became immune from franchises, to the pleasure of ISRI, that also filed an amicus brief. On the other hand, materials like wood and cardboard, with fluctuating markets, would be recycled by the collector, but were not valuable enough to offset the collection cost of driver and vehicle. These so-called negative material materials, often in mixed C&D became the friction point of the last 25 years between franchised haulers and non-franchised mixed C&D collectors.
The state Supreme Court decision was not a model of jurisprudence. Although the Court was purporting to interpret a state statute defining “solid waste” which the litigating parties argued was ambiguous, it did not follow state law in its method to resolve statutory ambiguity. State law precedent requires that a court interpreting a statute first look at its “plain meaning”, and if that was ambiguous, to be guided by the legislative purpose. But the Court did not cite any of the stated legislative purposes of AB 939. The Court did not cite the public policy of landfill avoidance. The Court did not cite the mandated hierarchy of resource recovery that put landfilling last in line. The Court did not cite the legislative command to develop markets for recovered material. State law is also clear that if the plain meaning of the statute is ambiguous and the legislative intent does not clarify the meaning, only then may the court resort to dictionary definitions. The Court used dictionary definitions of “discard” and “dispose” to justify its reasoning, but it selected one of many definitions found in the dictionary for these terms that helped its argument, ignoring others, and the definitions used by the court can no longer be found in published dictionaries today. The Court cited a District of Columbia case to support its conclusion but that case actually held the opposite. The Court did not address the Court of Appeal finding that the position of the cities and WMD was unconstitutional.
So while some recyclers were glad that the Court recognized that exclusive franchises could not cover all material, the recyclers that had to charge a collection service fee were faced with seemingly insurmountable legal problems in jurisdictions where the broadest possible franchise was granted.
An aggrieved recycler could file a state court case, but a trial court and a Court of Appeal were required to respect the Supreme Court precedent. A recycler could file a case and be resigned to losing in the trial court and court of appeal, in an effort to reach the Supreme Court again and request reconsideration. But the state Supreme Court is not required to hear all cases and in fact accepts less than 4% of those state cases that it is asked to review. One recycler in San Marcos tried this route and the Court would not hear the case.
An aggrieved recycler could try to file a federal law claim in federal court, but federal courts are required to defer to precedent established by a state Supreme Court deciding an issue of state law.
An aggrieved recycler could try to ask the state Legislature to change the statute to undo the state Supreme Court holding. Right after the Rancho Mirage case was decided, a waste hauler sponsored bill, SB 450, was introduced that would have allowed for exclusive franchising of all materials. NCRA and others mobilized to fight this bill and narrowly succeeded to defeat it. It was out of the question to think the Legislature would pass a recycler-supported bill to undo the Rancho Mirage case.
So mixed C&D recyclers were stuck. They could lobby local government politically to grant non-exclusive franchises that included C&D, like cities such as Oakland had. Local waste haulers often wielded a lot of local political clout. Political efforts to keep mixed C&D collection nonexclusive in Sonoma, San Mateo, and Contra Costa Counties failed.
Creative litigation strategies were tried. Since the legislature had declared landfilling harmful to the environment, the grant of a franchise inclusive of mixed C&D could be said to result in more landfilling and therefore environmental review under CEQA was required. This approach worked in Mendocino County. The threat of it worked in Napa County.
A Portland, Oregon, attorney specializing in transportation law argued successfully in the local federal court that a federal transportation statute, the FAAAA, preempted local exclusive franchises that included C&D (asbestos shingles in that case). But the Ninth Circuit reversed that case on procedural grounds. A California court of appeal case considered the same issue but the Court found that there was no preemption. The recycler in that case testified at deposition under oath with minimal preparation that what he hauled was “solid waste”, not recyclables, and that was enough for the Court.
An Alameda County fee for service paper collector defeated a challenge by a franchised hauler on the basis that the paper collector provided service – shredding- in addition to collection. Other C&D haulers looked at this possible way around the Rancho Mirage decision and found that the litigation cost and the uncertainty of success was not worth the fight. Deconstruction companies were not challenged to the best of the author’s knowledge. 1-800-Got-Junk franchises did not get targeted. The bait to get targeted by an exclusive franchisee was a roll off or debris box with signage listing the owner.
And so hope dimmed for C&D recyclers. Then, in 2010, the United States Supreme Court opened a door. In a plurality decision where there was a majority vote for the outcome but less than a majority approved any of the several grounds for the outcome, stated that a state Supreme Court, like any other government entity, could be found to act unconstitutionally where it impinged established property rights. This part of the decision was written by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, respected as a scholar even by his political opponents, and was joined by 3 other justices. If this was theoretically possible, then a federal court might be able to judge the constitutionality of a state Supreme Court action without being required to defer to it, if the decision impaired property rights that had been established previously. However no federal court so far has ever found that a state Supreme Court acted unconstitutionally in this manner.
Premier Recycling is a mixed C&D collector that has a fully permitted C&D recycling facility in San Jose. San Jose allows open competition for C&D while many of the smaller surrounding cities like Sunnyvale and Mountain View have exclusive franchises that cover C&D. It is difficult for a business to grow where it is limited geographically. It is like a plant in a planter box. Sonrise Consolidated was an early C&D collector in Alameda County that helped promote the mandatory C&D recycling laws passed in that County only to be forced out of business by a checkerboard of cities within the County where it was blocked from doing business by an exclusive franchise. Licensed contractors required by their building permit to document diversion could be tempted by a service provider that understood diversion to document it. Franchised haulers were not always as flexible about box delivery and pickup times as desired by the contractors.
Premier began to be targeted by cities within Santa Clara County for administrative fines where the city, acting for the franchised hauler, presented its case to a hearing officer employed by the City. Sunnyvale, whose SMART recovery center is a direct competitor of Premier’s C&D facility in San Jose, brought some of these actions.
Sunnyvale’s ordinance requires a permit to collect certain materials, C&D probably, but not clearly, among them. The ordinance speaks in terms of multiple licensees. Premier applied for a permit and was denied on the basis that Sunnyvale has an exclusive permitee. AB 939 allows exclusivity only where public health and welfare so require. The Sunnyvale City Council never made a public decision that the public health and welfare in Sunnyvale require exclusivity.
Premier filed suit in federal court asserting that its constitutional rights were deprived by Sunnyvale’s refusal to issue it a permit. Premier argued that Sunnyvale never made the finding required by law to grant exclusivity and that any action to grant exclusivity was void in light of the unconstitutionality of the Rancho Mirage decision as applied to a C&D fee for service collector in 2017. The District Court dismissed the case finding that Premier had not properly alleged a cognizable claim. Premier appealed. Squarely before the Ninth Circuit is whether or not the Court in Rancho Mirage ignored clearly established law and impinged on established property rights. While it is hard to predict that the Ninth Circuit will void a 25 year old state Supreme Court decision, Premier, never a party in the original Rancho Mirage case, at least will get its say about the jurisprudence of the case. Premier could also prevail on the issue that Sunnyvale never made the required finding before it granted an exclusive. Review of documents as part of a Public Records Act request makes clear that the exclusivity decision was made by staff working with the local hauler, not made by the City Council as required by the Brown Act.
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We Cannot Recycle Our Way Out Of Plastic Pollution

By John Douglas Moore, Co-Chair, NCRA Zero Waste Advocacy Committee

Please watch the 15 minute segment of Sunday, January 3’s edition of “60 Minutes” which first focused on Boyan Slat’s enterprise to clean-up large ocean plastic gyres by using a large net to collect it, and then segued to the global problem of plastic pollution, painting a pretty grim picture.

The show did not question Slat about what he intended to do with the collected plastic and gave a light brush to any current performance flaws in the technology. China’s National Sword was highlighted as impacting plastics recycling but did not address impacts on collected contaminated paper, cans, and bottles, and did not confront the big lie of single stream collection long advocated by monopolistic trash haulers.

An intelligent adult watching the show asked me “does this mean my plastic Starbucks cup does not get recycled when I put it in the store’s recycling bin?”

Lest you have any doubt that we cannot recycle our way out of plastic pollution and need to up our efforts to reduce plastic use and pollution, please watch this show segment. […]

 

What Does Brett Kavanaugh Have To Do With Zero Waste?

WHAT DOES BRETT KAVANAUGH HAVE TO DO WITH ZERO WASTE?
In case you have not read or heard enough about Brett Kavanagh
By John D. Moore, NCRA Vice President and Legal Counsel

Before being nominated to the Supreme Court, Brett Kavanagh was a judge of the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit. This Court frequently is asked to decide issues involving federal agencies, like EPA. EPA has extensive rules and regulations defining what is “recycling” or “recyclable” as distinct from solid waste. Hazardous waste is simply a subset of solid waste. EPA’s definitions have been used by other Courts in a variety of circumstances. Trust me that these regulations are difficult to follow with exceptions, exceptions to the exceptions, and tables purporting to summarize all these rules that are found in at least 10 places. On the other hand, “Solid waste” has never been defined by the Supreme Court notwithstanding that the Court has long declared solid waste to be an article of commerce for purposes of applying the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to local government actions involving flow control. Since Judge Kavanagh may have opportunity to shape the definitions of recycling and solid was a member of the Supreme Court, it is worth looking at Court decisions he has participated in which EPA’s definitions were challenged. EPA’s remit under the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is to regulate landfill standards and to regulate disposal of hazardous waste. When a collector wants to salvage recyclable material from a hazardous item of waste, such as a foundry sand containing lead, this intersects with EPA’s regulatory oversight. For this purpose EPA has tried to distinguish and define “sham recycling.”

A lot of EPA’s rules were challenged by Industry Groups and the Sierra Club. Judge Kavanagh concurred in the majority (2-1) opinion. It really isn’t possible to summarize this case with any brevity since there were several discreet issues in interpreting interlocking regulations with extensive legislative and regulatory history found in the Federal Register. This cannot be quickly outlined. But there were two aspects of this opinion, API v. EPA 862 F.3d 50 (DC Cir 2017), that I thought reflected on Judge Kavanagh’s suitability to serve on the Supreme Court. One, the majority was able to comprehend an enormous regulatory scheme; and 2) the opinion reflects an understanding that RCRA and EPA regulations are not aimed at “materials that otherwise would become solid waste.”

This first impression relates to “qualification” to serve on the Supreme Court. As we have seen, these “qualifications” are not defined or even commonly understood, let alone uniformly applied. It’s a little like voting for the MVP in professional sport; it’s in the eye of the beholder and reflects the values of the beholder. I have observed in law practice a similar definitional problem. In child custody disputes, the overriding concern is the “best interests of the child.” And who could argue with that? But divorcing parents often have dissimilar views of what this means and their view is often colored by their perception of the other contestant for custody. In a no-fault divorce state like California there is no forum for a divorcing spouse to say why the other spouse is so bad. So that need for emotional outlet gets transferred unfortunately onto a fight over what is best for the child; with ugly results. You could make a good case that the framers of the Constitution intended that the selection of a Supreme Court justice with the “advise and consent of the Senate” be a political process and that the political party with the majority power got to use its own interpretation of qualifications for the office. And if the Senate majority decides that a past sexual assault and lying to the Senate were not disqualifiers, the framers would say “so be it”.

If one likes Judge Kavanagh’s views about distinguishing solid waste from recyclable and that “like” satisfies the “qualification” requirement, this is using a political view to make a political decision. And just like tribal societies in Central Asia, history is a cycle of those who are in and those who are out and where those that are in take what they want without regard to the overall health of the nation. I am sure that the framers did not intend this to happen. Many writers have opined how our country got to this state but few propose a solution to return to democracy and polite discourse in favor of the best interests of the country. When our leaders behave like spoiled children they are not acting in the best interests of the country.

Politics works in different and strange ways. Most blue state voters would agree that Earl Warren was among our greatest Supreme Court justices. But his appointment, having a very California flavor, was as political as any. There were 3 prominent Republican politicians who coveted the Presidency in the early 1950s. One was Warren, a popular 3 term Governor of California (and former Alameda County District Attorney who sought the death penalty), Senator William Knowland of Oakland (and owner of the Tribune then) who was the Senate Majority leader (the Mitch McConnell position) and Vice-President Richard Nixon of Whittier. The popular version of this story is that Knowland and Nixon went to President Eisenhower and asked that Warren be made Chief Justice to get him out of California politics. Many Republicans came to regret that choice and campaigned in the 1960s to have Warren impeached. Through this terribly political process came the one Justice with the skill to insist that Brown v. Board of Education end racial segregation and that the Court so rule unanimously to preempt any question of its legitimacy. Another Justice on that Court was Hugo Black of Mississippi who was a member of the Ku Klux Klan at the same age that Judge Kavanagh was throwing down brewskis. If either Warren or Black’s confirmation hearing resulted in them yelling about Democratic party conspiracies, I am not aware of it and seems unlikely given their temperament.

It’s a scary time. Foreign countries may be influencing our elections by subterfuge, questioning what information and which news broadcaster can you trust. Or maybe they haven’t been and that is part of the subterfuge. And who has the skill to figure that out? This country has weathered many crises. It should have the resilience to withstand Donald Trump and Brett Kavanagh. But maybe Kavanagh will surprise like Earl Warren did. You may not want to see either politics or sausage being made but you can hope the output is palatable.

 

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Boone/Stein v. Alameda County Waste Management Authority

What Happened and Why
By John D. Moore, NCRA Vice President and Legal Counsel, and Alameda County Source Reduction and Recycling Board Environmental Organization Member

Editors note: The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the view of NCRA or the Recycling Board.

In 2011, Waste Management (WM) obtained a permit from the City of San Leandro for expanded composting and anaerobic digestion at its Davis Street Transfer Station (DSTS). For California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) compliance in 2011, San Leandro issued a negative declaration. As part of the 2011 permitting process WM obtained an amendment to the County Integrated Waste Management Plan (CoIWMP) that describes its 2011 plans. In 2017, WM decided it wanted to perform mixed waste composting at DSTS instead of what was approved in 2011. WM needed another amendment to the CoIWMP that described its 2017 plans and needed the Alameda County Waste Management Authority (ACWMA and StopWaste) to approve that amendment. In conjunction with this proposed CoIWMP amendment, the ACWMA was required to consider CEQA again and decide whether or not to require environmental review resulting from the project changes since 2011 and whether these changes posed significant potential adverse environmental impact. Stopwaste found that there had been no changes to the project since 2011 so that no further CEQA review was required. Arthur Boone and Dr. Toni Stein objected to the CEQA determination before the ACWMA, hired private counsel at their own expense and filed suit under CEQA for the ACWMA’s refusal to perform further environmental review.

First, the Court tentatively ruled in favor of Boone and Stein although its tentative ruling did not read like much of an endorsement of their suit. After oral argument the Court changed its mind and ruled in favor of the County and WM. Then, Boone/Stein asked Judge Ronni McLaren to reconsider her ruling, which she did. In Judge McLaren’s reconsidered ruling she again tentatively ruled in favor of Boone/Stein; this time in a more committed fashion. But, after oral argument, Judge McLaren changed her mind yet again and ruled in favor of the County and WM.

Why did Judge McLaren change her mind so much? There is no way to know for sure. At the start of the first hearing Judge McLaren announced that this was the first CEQA case that she had ever decided. That said, it appeared that Judge McLaren spent a lot of time and effort reviewing and considering the law. CEQA has two competing underlying policies: one is for full public transparency and disclosure of potential significant environmental impacts of proposed projects; the other is finality of public agency decisions about the project. CEQA requires the Court to give a lot of deference to public agency fact finding concerning CEQA evaluations. Stopwaste found that there had been no change in the project since 2011. I think Judge McLaren realized that this was just untrue and that the current proposed project never had a full CEQA review, but could not see what potential environmental impacts would result from the project changes that had been raised before the ACWMA. Judge McLaren had to follow the law requiring deference to Stopwaste’s determination of no project changes. The Court’s review was also limited to objections actually made at the agency hearing which focused more on air emissions than zero waste issues. .

Boone and Stein could appeal and argue that Judge McLaren applied the wrong legal standard in her decision. Courts of Appeal likewise give much deference to a trial court’s factual finding, i.e. that the administrative record before the ACWMA did not show potential significant environmental impacts from the changes in the project. Statistically, I think that the odds are very high that Boone/Stein would lose in a court of appeal.

Any other ways to challenge the WM project? WM has a 2011 permit from the City of San Leandro. The DSTS is also bound by a master plan including the site, which was approved by the City of San Leandro in 1998. If the current project violates either of these approvals, a possible challenge exists but a very quick statute of limitations is running on such a challenge.

What sort of further environmental review should have occurred? Recognizing that the project did change from 2011 and that mixed waste composting had not yet been tried in the US, potential environmental impacts of poor quality of output compost and the possible negative impact on source separation are things I think should have been studied. After the ACWMA hearing there was media coverage of the dissatisfaction of several European countries with mixed waste composting because of claimed poor quality of the output. A press release in connection with these reports coined the phrase “Compost-like output” or CLOs when discussing compost made from mixed waste.

Would that have made any difference, if known by the ACWMA? To me that seems unlikely. The ACWMA is a joint powers agency made up of all of the cities within the county plus two sanitary districts that provide for solid waste and recyclables collection. As a political body, its decisions are sometimes made for political reasons and it is possible under CEQA for a public agency to approve a project no matter how bad the disclosed environmental impacts would be. That said, one member of the ACWMA, the City of Oakland, was heavily invested in the approval of the mixed waste composting facility at DSTS because it is part of its franchise agreement with WM. Do I think that a majority of the ACWMA members would have voted to deny approval of a project so important to the largest city within the County? I think that is unlikely. The realistic best outcome would have been to impose some quality requirements in the compost output. WM told the ACWMA that its compost would meet certification requirements of one of the NGOs that certify compost. But this promise is not stated in any of the permits.

In hindsight, NCRA should have appeared at the ACWMA CoIWMP amendment hearing and raised concerns about source separation and compost quality, if only to ask the ACWMA to impose permit conditions relating to these concerns. I feel like in hindsight I should have pushed more in that direction. These concerns might ultimately have convinced Judge McLaren to insist upon more environmental review of the mixed waste processing component. But in the end I think the ACWMA would have approved the project anyway.

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Burn Them, Burn Them All

Burn Them, Burn Them All [1]

By John D. Moore, NCRA Vice President and Legal Counsel, Henn, Etzel & Moore, Inc.

CA Department Of Public Health Enjoined From Enforcing Restriction On Medical Waste Crossing State Lines. Does new ruling impact Al Co drug take back ordinance?

The Commerce Clause of the US Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8) has an odd relationship to the field of solid waste. In 1978 the US Supreme Court issued its first decision since 1905 that related to garbage and found that solid waste was an “article of commerce” covered by the Commerce Clause [2] .

The Commerce Clause reserves to Congress the right to regulate interstate commerce; the purpose being to preserve a “Union” and guard against state “protectionist” laws. The 1979 case involved a state (New Jersey) passing a law forbidding the importation of solid waste into that state; a law passed because of dwindling landfill space there, a situation then existing in many East Coast states. The Supreme Court struck down the New Jersey law finding that “solid waste” is an “article of commerce” that New Jersey improperly regulated. The Court did not say exactly what about the nature of solid waste makes it an “article of commerce”. [3]

By labeling “solid waste” an article of commerce, the Court later struck down laws where local government commanded that solid waste be disposed of only at a facility directed by the local government. [4] The Court later modified its holding to allow local government to direct solid waste to facilities owned and operated by the local government. [5]

The Commerce Clause was applied to Alameda County’s pharmaceutical take back ordinance, and held constitutional by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. [6] An intrastate limitation on the import of solid waste was held constitutional by the Solano County Superior Court. [7] A state case found that the Commerce Clause did not preclude an exclusive solid waste franchise arrangement in Pleasant Hill, CA. [8]

Last week the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a portion of the state of California’s laws, as applied by Cal DPH, regulating the disposal of medical waste, on Commerce Clause grounds. Again, the Court did not examine why medical waste is an “article of commerce” and both it and the parties assumed that it was.

Under California law, medical waste collected within the state must be incinerated, and, if transported out of state, must be “consigned to a permitted medical waste facility in the receiving state. [9]

The plaintiff in the case operated a permitted medical waste transfer station in Fresno, where it received medical waste collected by an affiliated company. Because there was not a permitted medical waste incinerator in California, the plaintiff transported the medical waste first to an incinerator in Maryland. Then, to reduce disposal expenses, the plaintiff began transporting the medical waste to facilities in Kentucky and Indiana for “autoclave” and “thermal deactivation” treatment permitted in those states. Both of these processes involve heating the medical waste; it does not appear that anyone argued that these processes are de facto incineration under state law.

Cal DPH then threatened the plaintiff with fines, taking the position that medical waste shipped out of state still must be incinerated. The only statutory support for this position is when the “receiving state” does not have a permitted facility, in which case the medical waste must be incinerated. (Where that could be is an unresolved question.) But the plaintiff’s medical waste was taken to permitted facilities in Kentucky and Indiana.

Plaintiff filed suit in US District Court and obtained a preliminary injunction against the state, forbidding imposition of penalties or other regulatory action by Cal DPH. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction stating

“Were it otherwise, California could purport to regulate the use or disposal of any item—product or refuse—everywhere in the country if it had its origin in California. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Daniels was likely to succeed on the merits and enjoined the Department officials from “enforcing the MWMA against Daniels’s out-of-state waste disposal.”

The Ninth Circuit treated this as a clear case of violating the Commerce Clause, as it considered Alameda County’s pharma ordinance to not impair interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit did not comment on the difference between the statute requiring out of state treatment of medical waste at a permitted facility and Cal DPH’s interpretation of this statute. From experience I can relate that there often are facts in a case on appeal that the parties deem pertinent, where the Court does not share this view.

Hopefully the technology for safe disposal of medical waste will provide a solution besides incineration, possibly by the field of fungi-based  mycoremediation. Please continue looking to this column to report on new applications of the Commerce Clause to solid waste and recyclable material.

And if you have read all the way to the end, please send me an email at jmoore@recyclelaw so I can tell if these legal articles are worth publishing in the NCRA News.

[1] Game of Thrones quoting the last words of Aegon Targaryen, King of Westeros

[2] Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978) 437 US 617, 622-623

[3] Indeed, if the California Supreme Court was right in saying that “solid waste” was something valueless that an owner paid to dispose, how could something valueless, like solid waste, be an “article of commerce”. See Waste Management of the Desert v. Palm Springs Recycling Center (1994) 7 Cal.4th 478

[4].C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown (1994),511 U.S. 383

[5] United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344 (2007)

[6] Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. County of Alameda (9 Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d 1037

[7] NCRA v. County of Solano case no. FCS03687 Judgment entered May 30, 2009

[8] Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cty. Inc. v. Biagini Waste Reduction Sys., Inc. (1988) 63 Cal. App. 4th 1488

[9] Health and Safety Code Section 118000(c)